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ABSTRACT
To assess the consequences of advance medical directives -- which explicitly specify a patient's
preferences for one or more specific types of medical treatment in the event of a loss of competence
n we analyze the medical care of elderly Medicare beneficiaries who died between 1985-1995. We
compare the care of patients from states that adopted laws enhancing incentives for compliance with
advance directives and laws requiring the appointment of a health care surrogate in the absence of
an advance directive to the care of patients from states that did not. We report three key findings.
First, laws enhancing incentives for compliance significantly reduce the probability of dying in an
acute care hospital. Second, laws requiring the appointment of a surrogate significantly increase the
probability of receiving acute care in the last month of life, but decrease the probability of receiving
nonacute care. Third, neither type of law leads to any savings in medical expenditures.
Daniel Kessler
Stanford University
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Introduction
The consequences of advance medical directives – which explicitly specify a patient’s
preferences for one or more specific types of medical treatment in the event of a loss of
competence, generally at the end of life (EOL) – have been extensively debated by physicians,
philosophers, and social scientists.  On one hand, proponents of advance directives argue that
they address two important social problems.  First, since substantial health care resources are
consumed at the EOL, advance directives that specify preferences to forgo treatment have the
potential to reduce health care costs.  In 1990, the 6.6% of Medicare recipients who died
accounted for 22% of program expenditures, a pattern that has changed little over time (Lubitz
and Riley 1993). 
Second, patient autonomy and well-being may also be enhanced by the use of advance
directives.  Although society has reached a consensus that treatment decisions should reflect
patients’ informed preferences (e.g., Teno et al. 1994), this ideal is often not implemented in
practice.  Because patients for whom advance directives are relevant are incapacitated and
because the common-law right of patients to refuse treatment is unclear (Redleaf et al. 1979),
physicians traditionally have made such treatment decisions in consultation with the
incapacitated patient’s family members.  But because physicians’ and patient-surrogates’
perceptions of patients’ preferences are often inaccurate (Teno et al. 1995; Layde et al. 1995;
Hare et al. 1992), substituted judgment in this context may result in medical treatment decisions
that do not reflect patients’ wishes.  This is especially important because treatment at the EOL
may be of questionable value.  For example, Altman (2001) reports that many cancer patients
receive chemotherapy at the EOL, even if their type of cancer is known to be unresponsive to the4
drugs. 
On the other hand, a substantial body of work has found that advance directives do not
deal effectively with these issues.  Advance directives may be infrequently used by patients
(Menikoff et al. 1992), and, when they are, not consistently followed by physicians (Covinsky et
al. 2000).  People may believe that their wishes will be carried out even in the absence of an
advance directive.  Physicians may believe that advance directives are medically unethical, if the
preference of patients who are near death differ from those patients’ preferences at the time they
executed their advance directive (Byrne and Thompson 2000).
Yet, virtually all existing research focuses on the effect on an individual’s care of his or
her adoption of an advance directive, despite the fact that the enforceability of and the incentives
for compliance with advance directives are largely determined by statutes that differ from state
to state.   In this paper, we explore how these state laws affect care at the EOL.  We analyze the
medical treatment received by a 20 percent random sample of elderly Medicare beneficiaries
who died between 1985-1995.   We compare the care of patients who died in states that adopted
laws enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives and laws requiring the
appointment of a health care surrogate in the absence of an advance directive to the care of
patients in states that did not.  To investigate whether these laws affect patients differently
depending on their cause of death or their educational attainment, we stratify our sample of
Medicare beneficiaries by matching it with information from the US National Center for Health
Statistics Public Use Multiple Cause of Death file. 
This paper proceeds in five sections.  Section I discusses previous investigations of the
effects of advance directives.  Although this research shows how advance directives affect5
treatment given a system of law, it does not investigate how the laws that specify the incentives
for compliance with advance directives affect EOL care.  Section I concludes that differences in
states’ legal environments may explain some of the differences in findings in the existing
literature.  Section I also concludes that another body of law may affect treatment at the EOL:
state health care surrogate laws, which impose default rules on surrogates’ decision-making even
in the absence of an advance directive.  Section II presents our empirical models of how legal,
market, and other factors determine EOL care.  Section III describes our data in detail.  Section
IV presents our results, and Section V concludes. 
I. The Effects of Advance Directives on Care at the EOL
Advance directives provide a formal, legal mechanism for a competent person to specify
her preferences for medical treatment in case she becomes unable to make decisions.  Federal
and state law govern the extent to which advance directives constrain the decision-making
processes of doctors and hospitals.  In 1991, Congress adopted the Patient Self Determination
Act, which requires that institutions inform patients that they can execute a formal advance
directive (Teno et al. 1994).  States have passed two types of laws governing treatment of the
incapacitated.  The first type of law specifies the conditions under which doctors and hospitals
must follow advance directives and the punishment (if any) that they bear from failing to do so. 
The second type of law specifies how treatment decisions are made for incompetent patients in
the absence of an advance directive.
The existing literature paints an equivocal picture of the consequences of advance
directives.  One arm of the literature uses surveys of physicians and patients to assess the effects6
of advance directives.  Although early work reports that both doctors and patients believe
advance directives affect patient care (e.g., Klutch 1978, Redleaf et al. 1979), subsequent survey
research questions this conclusion.  In an analysis of interviews with 126 nursing home residents
and their families, Danis et al. (1991) found that care was consistent with patients’ previously
expressed wishes 75 percent of the time; however, the presence of a written advance directive
did not improve the consistency of care with patients’ wishes.  Based on a comparison of
patients’ actual advance directives to their detailed survey responses, Schneiderman et al.
(1992b) suggest that this lack of efficacy may be due to the failure of instructions in standard-
form advance directives to adequately communicate patient wishes to physicians.
A second arm uses observational data to compare the treatment decisions, health care
expenditures, and health outcomes of severely ill patients who expressed a preference to forgo
treatment to those of patients who did not.  Studies using this method employ regression analysis
to adjust for differences in health and socioeconomic characteristics across patients, calculating
the effect of expressed patient preferences on treatments and outcomes, holding other factors
constant.  These studies also come to conflicting conclusions, with some work finding that
expressed patient preferences in some forms can reduce treatment intensity (Teno et al. 1995)
and hospital charges (Chambers et al. 1994, Weeks et al. 1994), and other work finding that
advance directives have no impact on either treatments or outcomes, over and above the effect of
more-informally-expressed patient preferences (Teno et al. 1994).
However, because observational data on health status is notoriously incomplete,
unobserved differences across patients may lead the estimated effects of advance directives to
either overstate or understate the true impact of patient preferences.  A third set of studies seeks7
to eliminate this potential bias through the use of randomized controlled trials (RCTs), in which
patients randomized to a “treatment” group are offered the opportunity to execute an advance
directive and patients randomized to the “control” group are not.  Based on an RCT,
Schneiderman et al. (1992a) find that the act of offering patients with a life-threatening illness
the opportunity to execute an advance directive has no statistically significant effect on medical
treatments, health care expenditures, or other psychosocial and health outcomes.  Similarly, in
the Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences of Outcomes and Risks of Treatment
(SUPPORT), neither providing additional information to patients and health care providers about
prognosis and patient rights (SUPPORT 1995) nor increasing documentation of advance
directives (Teno et al. 1997) reduced the use of intensive medical services near the end of life. 
In contrast, also using an RCT, Molloy et al. (2000) report that a comprehensive program to
educate health care providers, patients, and family members about advance directives reduced
health services utilization without affecting satisfaction or mortality.   
Although RCTs estimate treatment effects without the bias to which nonexperimental
studies are prone, they may not provide accurate guidance about the effects of feasible legal
reforms on actual medical practice.  For two reasons, RCTs that offer patients the opportunity to
execute a directive could show no effect, even if laws governing advance directives affect
medical practice.  First, the RCT might have been conducted in a state with weak or nonexistent
incentives for compliance.  Second, laws enhancing incentives for compliance with advance
directives may increase doctors propensity to respect the preferences of patients both with and
without advance directives.  Furthermore, there are no RCTs examining how other related laws,
such as those governing health care surrogates’ treatment decisions, interact with the use of8
advance directives to affect EOL care.  
The failure of the literature to investigate how state laws affect EOL care is striking,
since existing studies suggest that the incentives provided by laws are an important determinant
of the effectiveness of advance directives.  RCTs from states (such as California) that provide
strong incentives compliance with patients’ wishes observe that patients’ preferences about
intensive resuscitation measures were routinely elicited in detail before they lost decisionmaking
capacity, regardless of whether the patient had actually executed an advance directive
(Schneiderman et al. (1992a)).  By comparison, North Carolina has a weaker living will law, and
Danis et al. (1991) found that care was consistent with patients’ previously expressed wishes in
only 75 percent of cases. 
II. Empirical Models
Our modeling strategy and data are similar to those used in Kessler and McClellan
(2002).  We model the effects of law changes as differences in time trends across states in the
medical care of elderly Medicare decedents during the eleven-year period 1985-1995.  We
measure five medical care outcomes for patients at the EOL: the location of death (in or out of
acute care hospital), whether the patient had an acute care hospital stay in the month before
death, whether the patient had a nonacute care (mainly skilled nursing) stay in the month before
death, the natural logarithm of acute care hospital expenditures in the last month of life
conditional on having an acute care stay, and the natural logarithm of nonacute care expenditures
in the last month of life conditional on having a nonacute care stay.  We specify these outcomes
as nonparametric functions of patient demographic characteristics; state-level legal, political, and9
health-care market characteristics; and state- and time-fixed-effects. 
While this strategy fundamentally involves differences-in-differences (DD) between
reforming and nonreforming states to identify effects, we modify conventional DD estimation
strategies in several ways.  First, as noted above, our models include few restrictive parametric
or distributional assumptions about functional forms.  Second, we allow law reforms to have
dynamic effects on treatment decisions.  We separately estimate the effect of law reforms for
individuals who died shortly after the adoption of an advance directive law versus long after
adoption of a relevant law. 
We use a panel-data framework with observations on successive cohorts of decedents.  In
state s = 1...S during year t = 1...T, our observational units consist of individuals I=1...Nst who
died.  Each patient has observable characteristics Xist, including race, gender, and age, which we
describe as a fully-interacted set of binary variables, as well as many unobservable
characteristics that also influence their course of medical treatment.  The individual receives
treatment of Rist in the month before death, where R denotes one of the five measures discussed
above. 
We define state laws affecting advance directives and health care surrogacy in effect at
the time of each individual’s death with four categorical variables.  We classify each state as
having adopted or not adopted one of two types of laws: laws enhancing physicians’ and
hospitals’ incentives for compliance with advance directives, and laws requiring delegation of
treatment decision-making in the absence of an advance directive.  Some laws enhancing
incentives for compliance simply state that advance treatment directives of an approved form are
legally binding; others specify civil and/or criminal penalties for physician disregard of a valid10
(1)
advance directive; others specify conditions under which a physician can refuse to comply with
an advance directive; others provide a liability waiver for actions arising out of good-faith
compliance with an advance directive.  Laws requiring delegation of treatment decisions to a
health care surrogate in the absence of an advance directive generally specify the conditions
under which and the individuals from whom a physician or hospital must seek guidance for
treatment of a dying patient.  Table 1 specifies which states require delegation of treatment
decisions (by the end of our study period, all states had adopted laws providing incentives for
compliance with advance directives) and when each state adopted each type of law.  
To distinguish long-term from short-term effects of law reforms, we estimate dynamic
models that separate the effect of reforms soon after and long after their adoption.  We define 
L1st=1 if state s adopted a law enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives
between 1986 and 1995, but no more than two years before the patient’s year t death (i.e., in year
t through t-2), L2st=1 if state s adopted such a law in year t-3 or before (three or more years
before the patient’s death), L3st=1 if state s adopted a law requiring delegation of treatment
decision-making to a specified health care surrogate between 1986 and 1995, but no more than
two years before the patient’s death, and L4st=1 if state s adopted a law requiring delegation of
treatment decision-making to a specified health care surrogate between 1986 and 1995 three or
more years before the patient’s death.  
We first estimate linear models of the following form: 
where 2t is a time fixed-effect, "s is a state fixed-effect, Rist and Xist are defined as above, Wst is a1W includes the contemporaneous and one-year-lagged political party of each state’s
governor, the majority political party of each house of each state’s legislature, and
contemporaneous and one-year-lagged interaction effects between these two variables.
2Mst includes controls for three binary variables capturing whether the state’s managed
care enrollment was above the 25
th, 50
th, or 75
th percentile of enrollment rates (0.062, 0.114, and
0.166, respectively).
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vector of variables described in Kessler and McClellan (1996) which summarize the legal-
political environment of the state over time,
1 Lst = [L1st, ..., L4st] is a 4-dimensional binary vector
describing the existence of law reforms, Mst is a vector of other market environment controls,
2
and vist is an error term with E(vist
 | Xist, Lst, Wst, Mst) = 0.
Because legal reforms may affect both the level and the growth rate of expenditures, we
estimate different baseline time trends 2t for states adopting in 1985 or earlier each of the four
types of law reforms that we study (since our models include state fixed effects, we can not
estimate the effect of such reforms on the level of utilization).   We allow the time trend in
utilization and location of death to vary after versus before January 1, 1990 for decedents from
states adopting laws enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives in 1985 or
earlier, and for decedents from states adopting health care surrogate laws in 1985 or earlier.
We also examine the effect of law reforms separately for certain subgroups of patients
that reforms are likely to affect differently.  First, we estimate the effect of laws separately for
patients dying from cancer, because the risk of fatality and lack of acuity associated with many
cancers mean that EOL care decisions are explicitly considered by such patients (e.g.,
Steinhauser et al. 2000).  Second, we examine the differential impact of laws by patients’ level of
educational attainment.  More educated patients may be more likely to have the resources that
enable them to affect their EOL care.  But even if they do, laws may have greater or lesser12
effects for more educated patients, depending on the effectiveness of laws as a substitute for or
complement to patients’ private efforts.   Models that interact laws with patients’ education are
of the form:
(2)
where Eist is a vector of two variables denoting the proportion of individuals in patient i’s
demographic cell who graduated from high school or who had missing educational attainment 
(omitted group includes patients with less than high school education; see description below of
how Eist is constructed).  In these models, we also allow the different baseline time trends 2t for
states adopting reforms in 1985 or earlier to vary by patients’ educational attainment.
III. Data
The data used in our study come from three principal sources.  First, we use
comprehensive longitudinal Medicare claims data for a 20 percent random sample of the vast
majority of elderly beneficiaries who died in the years 1985-1995 (death dates are based on
death reports validated by the Social Security Administration).   We exclude patients in
Medicare HMOs (reliable individual-level treatment information on such individuals was not
available until recently).  Data on patient demographic characteristics were obtained from the
Health Care Financing Administration’s HISKEW enrollment files.  Measures of both acute and
nonacute hospital expenditures were obtained by adding up all hospital reimbursements
(including copayments and deductibles not paid by Medicare) from insurance claims for all
treatments in the month preceding each patient’s death.  These expenditures reflect variation in13
actual resource use even under the DRG-based Medicare Prospective Payment System, since the
provision of intensive treatments, very costly stays, transfers, and readmissions for acute care
and nonacute care (“rehabilitation”) all lead to higher hospital expenditures.  We use claims data
to identify if patients’ date of death was during a Medicare acute hospital stay.
Second, we match to this data information on patients’ educational attainment and cause-
of-death from the National Center for Health Statistics Public Use Multiple Cause of Death for
ICD-9 file, which contains information from every death certificate recorded in the U.S.,
including the ICD-9 code(s) denoting underlying cause of death and any other (secondary) cause
of death.  The NCHS data also contains information on the decedent’s educational attainment
(for 1986 and later; educational attainment is missing for all decedents for 1985) and
demographic information including age at death, race, sex, year, month and day of  death (day of
week only after 1990), and state of birth.  We use demographic information from the NCHS data
to construct demographic cells for decedents that describe the distribution of possible actual
causes of death and educational attainment for Medicare beneficiaries that share similar
demographic characteristics, imputing the state of birth from the Medicare identifier.  This
enables us to identify the cause of death of 63% of our sample of Medicare decedents.  Of the
remaining 37%, we first seek to choose from the set of possible NCHS causes given the
decedent’s demographics that cause that represents the plurality of inpatient expenditures in the
two years prior to death.  This enables us to identify the cause of death of an additional 8% of
decedents.  Of the remaining 29%, we seek to assign the cause that represents the plurality of
inpatient expenditures in the two years prior to death.  This enables us to identify the cause of
death of an additional 24%.  The remaining 5% have an unspecified cause.  We define Eist as the14
proportion of individuals in patient i’s demographic cell who had less than high school
education, who graduated from high school, or who had missing educational attainment.   In
other work (Shearer et al. 2002), we describe this matching process and our validation of it in
greater detail.  
Third, we match patient data with information on annual managed care enrollment rates
by state from InterStudy Publications, a division of Decision Resources, Inc. Managed care
enrollment excludes patients enrolled in preferred provider organizations (which are effectively a
form of discounted FFS insurance); point-of-service plans that are not subject to state HMO
regulation; and plans that are self-insured by employers, even if they are administered by a
MCO.   Enrollment rates were calculated by dividing the number of enrollees (exclusive of
Medicare supplementary enrollees) by the population.  We control for managed care enrollment
because it may change over time and affect the treatment decisions of Medicare patients through
spillover effects (e.g., Baker 1999).
Table 2 describes our random samples of elderly decedents from 1985, 1990 and 1995. 
Table 2 demonstrates some of the well-known trends in the medical care for the elderly over this
period.  Over the period, patients were increasingly less likely to die in an acute care hospital (or
have an acute care hospital stay in the last month of life), but conditional on an stay, were treated
much more intensively, such that acute care hospital expenditures conditional on a stay for
patients in the last month of life grew in real terms at 2.8 (=1.350
1/11 - 1) percent per year. 
Because reimbursement given treatment choice for Medicare patients did not increase over this
period (McClellan 1997), these expenditure trends are attributable to increases in intensity of
treatment.   Provision of nonacute services through Medicare in the last month of life became15
both much more common – more than doubling in frequency from 6.4 percent of decedents in
1985 to fully 15 percent of decedents in 1995 – and more intensive conditional on a nonacute
stay.  Table 2 also shows how the laws governing EOL care changed over the study period.  In
1985, only 62.6 percent of decedents resided in a state that provided doctors and hospitals with
explicit incentives to comply with advance directives, but by 1995, all states had adopted such a
law.  Over this period, states also adopted laws requiring delegation of treatment decision-
making to specified parties in the absence of an advance directive: in 1985, only 23.4 percent of
decedents resided in a state that required delegation, but by 1995, 53.3 percent of decedents were
subject to such a law.  
IV. Results
Table 3 presents estimates of parameters from equation (1), the effects of laws governing
treatment at the end of life on the location of death and intensity of medical care in the last
month of life.  We present standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and for within
state/time group correlation in vist
 .  The top panel of the table shows that laws enhancing
incentives for compliance with advance directives lead to statistically significant changes in
patients’ location of death.  Decedents from states adopting laws 3 or more years prior to their
death enhancing incentives for compliance are .76 percentage points less likely (significant at the
10 percent level) to die in an acute care hospital.  On a 1995 base probability of dying in an acute
setting of 32.8 percent (table 2), this amounts to a 2.3 percent decline.  The effect of these laws
on the probability of an acute care hospital stay in the month and year before death is smaller,
consistent with the laws having the greatest impact on patients who are nearest to death.  The16
second column of the top panel of the table shows that laws enhancing compliance lead to a
(statistically insignificant) .51 percentage point decline in the probability of an acute care
hospital stay in the month before death; estimates not in table 3 show that such laws lead to a
(statistically insignificant) .33 percentage point decline in the probability of an acute care
hospital stay in the year before death.  The long-run effect of these laws on the level of acute
care expenditures in the last month of life conditional an acute care stay is positive but
statistically insignificant. 
The bottom panel of table 3 presents estimates of the effect of laws requiring delegation
of treatment decision-making in the absence of an advance directive.  Laws requiring delegation
of treatment decision-making lead uniformly to more acute and fewer nonacute hospital services
for decedents.   Those who died in a state requiring delegation were 0.76 percentage points more
likely to die in an acute care hospital, for decedents from states adopting such laws 3 or more
years before their death.  Laws requiring delegation also lead to increases in both the probability
of an acute care hospital stay at any time in the last month of life and to increases in the
magnitude of acute care expenditures, conditional on a hospital stay.  In contrast, laws requiring
delegation led to substantially less frequent nonacute stays -- in the long run, 1.76 percentage
points fewer.  Given that 25 percent of all decedents had a nonacute stay in the last year of life in
1995 (table 2), this effect is substantial.  Table 3 shows that laws governing treatment at the EOL
-- both those enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives and those requiring
delegation of treatment decision-making in the absence of an advance directive -- take time to
reach their full effect.  In general, the effect of such laws is larger and more precisely estimated
for laws in place at least 3 years prior to the individual’s death.17
Both of the two types of laws that we study had a net positive impact on Medicare
hospital expenditures.  Laws enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives lead
to long-run increases in acute care expenditures in the last month of life of $345 ( = (-.00506 +
0.0523*0.748)*1995 average acute care expenditures of $10,115 (table 2)) and long-run
decreases in nonacute care expenditures of $10 (= (.00825 - .0425*0.25)*1995 average nonacute
care expenditures of $4,007 (table 2)), for a net positive effect of $335 per decedent.  Laws
requiring delegation of treatment decision-making lead to long-run increases in acute care
expenditures of $494 (=(.00979 +.0522*0.748)*10,115) and long-run decreases in nonacute care
expenditures of $115 (=(-.0176 + .0446*.25)*4,007), for a net positive effect of $379 per
decedent.
Table 4 presents estimates of parameters from equation (1) obtained only on patients who
died from cancer.  First, the table shows that the long-run effect of laws enhancing compliance
with advance directives on the location of death is almost twice as large for cancer decedents as
for the entire population of decedents -- a 1.38 percentage point reduction in the probability of
dying in an acute care hospital as compared to a .76 percentage point reduction (table 3).  The
long-run effect of such laws on the probability of receiving nonacute care for cancer decedents is
almost twice as large as well -- a 1.65 percentage point increase as compared to a .83 percentage
point increase.  However, the long-run effect of laws requiring delegation on the probability of
dying in an acute care hospital is smaller in magnitude for cancer decedents, and statistically
insignificant.  
These effects lead both types of laws to have smaller (but still positive) net effects on
Medicare expenditures for cancer decedents.  Laws enhancing incentives for compliance with18
advance directives lead to long-run increases in acute care expenditures of $173 ( = (-.0106 +
0.0370*0.748)*1995 average acute care expenditures of $10,115) and in nonacute care
expenditures of $18 (= (.0164 - .0446*0.25)*1995 average nonacute care expenditures of
$4,007), for a net positive effect of $191 per decedent.  Laws requiring delegation of treatment
decision-making lead to long-run increases in acute care expenditures of $232 (=(.00297
+.0267*0.748)*10,115) and long-run decreases in nonacute care expenditures of $90 (=(-.0203 -
.0086*.25)*4,007), for a net positive effect of $142 per decedent.
Table 5 presents estimates of equation (2), and shows that the effect of laws governing
care at the EOL differ by decedents’ level of educational attainment.  On one hand, the effects of
laws enhancing compliance with advance directives are greater for less educated patients. 
Patients with less than a high-school education from states adopting laws enhancing incentives
are 1.88 percentage points less likely to die in an acute care hospital; this effect is half as large (=
-1.88 + .93) and statistically insignificant for patients with a high school education or greater. 
On the other hand, the effects of laws requiring delegation of treatment decision-making in the
absence of an advance directive are greater for more educated patients.  Patients with a high-
school education or greater from states adopting laws requiring delegation are .73 percentage
points statistically significantly more likely to die in an acute care hospital than are their
counterparts with less than a high-school education; the negative effect of laws requiring
delegation on the probability of a nonacute stay in the last month of life is statistically
significantly larger for more educated patients as well. 
V. Conclusion19
Can public policy play a constructive role in the management of health care at the EOL? 
At least in theory, state law specifies the process by which physicians and hospitals consider the
input of patients (through patients’ written advance directives) and their families or guardians (in
the absence of an applicable advance directive) in treatment decision-making.   Proponents of
laws enhancing providers’ incentives for compliance with patients’ advance directives argue that
the formal processes established by such laws improve patient autonomy and save money by
reducing unwanted, unproductive EOL treatments.  However, in practice, substantial clinical
evidence suggests that laws may not be the only, or even the most important, determinant of care
in this context.  Important concerns over inappropriate limitation of care for dying patients
further contributes to the theoretical ambiguity of the welfare consequences of laws guiding EOL
care.  
Yet, surprisingly little work has sought to evaluate the effects of such laws on patients’
care.  In this paper, we assess empirically the consequences of two types of laws – laws
enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives, and laws requiring the
appointment of a health care surrogate – on care at the EOL.  Based on an analysis of Medicare
claims data, matched with Social Security death records, we estimate the effect of variation
across states and over time in these laws on the location of patients’ death and the care received
at the EOL.  To investigate whether such laws have different effects on different types of
patients, we match information on cause of death and educational attainment from the National
Center for Health Statistics Public Use Multiple Cause of Death for ICD-9 file.  
We find that the laws that we study have a significant influence on patients’ EOL care. 
First, laws enhancing incentives for compliance significantly reduce the probability of dying in20
an acute care hospital.  However, they do not lead to any net savings in medical expenditures. 
Although laws lead to a reduction in expenditures through a reduction in the probability of an
acute care hospital stay, they also lead to a more-than-offsetting increase in expenditures
conditional on an acute care stay.   On net, such laws lead to a net average increase in total
hospital expenditures in the last month of life of $335, or about 2.4 percent of the 1995 average
of $14,122.  Laws requiring delegation of treatment decisions in the absence of an advance
directive significantly increase the probability of an acute care hospital stay and significantly
decrease the probability of a nonacute care hospital stay in the last month of life.  Laws requiring
delegation also have a positive effect on average expenditures in the last month of life, of $379
per decedent.  
Second, we find that laws enhancing incentives for compliance lead to almost twice as
large of a reduction in the probability of dying in an acute care hospital for patients dying from
cancer, consistent the laws having a larger causal effect for patients for whom EOL care
decisions are particularly important.  In addition, we find the expenditure-increasing effect of the
laws is smaller for cancer decedents than for the average decedent, largely because the laws have
approximately half as large an effect on the volume of acute care hospital services that cancer
decedents receive.
Third, we find that the effect of laws governing EOL treatment differ depending on a
patient’s educational attainment.  The effects of laws enhancing compliance with advance
directives are greater for less educated patients, but the effects of laws requiring delegation of
treatment decision-making in the absence of an advance directive are greater for more educated
patients. 21
These changes in patterns of care are consistent with some of the previous clinical
literature on the effects of advance directives.   Advance directives are not simply a device for
the refusal of treatment.  Although surveys find that treatment refusals are the most common
preference expressed in an advance directive, they are not the only one:  indeed, for some
illnesses, surveyed patients’ preferences were almost evenly split between a directive to supply
and a directive to withhold intensive treatment (Emanuel 1991).  Clinical studies have also
suggested that surrogates systematically opt for more intensive treatment than patients prefer. 
Layde et al. (1995) find among seriously ill patients favoring resuscitation, only 16 percent of
health care surrogates misconstrued patients’ wishes, but that among patients who did not want
to be resuscitated, 50 percent of surrogates misconstrued patients’ wishes.  
These results highlight several important remaining research questions.  In particular,
unless patients receive too little acute and too much nonacute care at the EOL, the results suggest
that laws requiring delegation of treatment decision-making in the absence of an advance
directive do not improve the alignment of EOL treatment with patient preferences -- particularly
for more educated patients.  This may be due to the fact that more educated patients have more
educated surrogates, who are better able to convince medical care providers of the patient’s
perceived wishes.  Further clinical or experimental investigation of programs to encourage
communication between patients and their surrogates (e.g., Hare 1992), or of alternative health
care surrogacy laws that provide incentives for surrogates to engage in such communication, has
the potential to enhance patient autonomy and conserve health care resources. 22
Table 1: State Laws Governing Treatment at the End of Life




Law requires delegation of
decisions in absence of
advance directive




Law requires delegation of
decisions in absence of
advance directive
Alabama 1981 Montana 1985 1991
Alaska 1986 Nebraska 1992
Arizona 1985 1992 Nevada 1977 1991
Arkansas 1977 1977 New Hampshire 1985
California 1976 New Jersey 1992
Colorado 1985 1992 New Mexico 1977 1984
Connecticut 1985 1985 New York 1988 1988
Delaware 1982 North Carolina 1977 1977
Florida 1984 1984 North Dakota 1989
Georgia 1984 1990 Ohio 1991 1991
Hawaii 1986 1986 Oklahoma 1985
Idaho 1977 Oregon 1977 1983
Illinois 1984 1991 Pennsylvania 1992
Indiana 1985 1987 Rhode Island 1991
Iowa 1985 1985 South Carolina 1986
Kansas 1979 South Dakota 1991
Kentucky 1990 Tennessee 1985
Louisiana 1984 1984 Texas 1977 1977
Maine 1989 1989 Utah 1985 1985
Maryland 1985 1993 Vermont 1982
Massachusetts 1990 Virginia 1983 1983
Michigan 1990 Washington 1979
Minnesota 1989 West Virginia 1984
Mississippi 1984 Wisconsin 1984
Missouri 1985 Wyoming 1984 198423
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
1985 1990 1995 1985-95
change
Died in acute care hospital 43.8% 40.1% 32.8% -11.0%
Acute hospital stay in month before death 59.6% 57.4% 52.6% -7.0%
Nonacute hospital stay in month before death 6.4% 9.7% 15.0% 8.6%
Acute hospital expenditures in month before
death
$7,494 $8,991 $10,115 35.0%
(5789) (8543) (11439)
Nonacute hospital expenditures in month before
death
$1,687 $2,498 $4,007 137.5%
(2188) (2585) (3940)
Age 79.54 79.94 80.60 1.33%
(8.113) (8.178) (8.195)
Gender (female) 51.6% 53.3% 54.7% 3.1%
Race (black) 7.4% 8.0% 8.3% 0.9%
Rural residence 27.2% 27.8% 28.7% 1.5%
High school education or greater ( 36.8% 48.8% (
Education missing ( 30.8% 16.1% (
Law enhancing incentives for compliance with
advance directives
62.6% 83.6% 100.0% 37.4%
Law requiring delegation of treatment decision
making in absence of advance directive
23.4% 38.1% 53.3% 29.9%
State HMO enrollment rate 7.5% 12.5% 16.8% 9.3%
N 242551 253948 271683 12.01%
Change reported in percentage points for dichotomous variables; change reported in percent for continuous variables.
Hospital expenditures in constant 1995 dollars. * - education missing for all observations for 1985.24
Table 3: Effect of Laws Governing Advance Directives on 


















Effect of laws enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives
death shortly after adoption 0.251 0.379 0.482 4.514 -5.106
(0.273) (0.256) (0.440) (2.516) (2.835)
death long after adoption -0.764 -0.506 0.825 5.225 -4.254
(0.445) (0.389) (0.614) (3.340) (3.480)
Effect of laws requiring delegation of treatment decision making in the absence of an advance directive
death shortly after adoption 0.294 0.806 -0.287 2.912 -2.285
(0.316) (0.361) (0.311) (2.625) (2.641)
death long after adoption 0.757 0.979 -1.758 5.215 -4.461
(0.427) (0.442) (0.544) (3.024) (3.746)
N 2780195 2780195 2780195 1580579 267474
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for within state/time cell correlation in parentheses. 25
Table 4: Effect of Laws Governing Advance Directives on 


















Effect of laws enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives
death shortly after adoption 0.180 0.425 1.110 3.129 -5.980
(0.447) (0.291) (0.486) (1.715) (3.496)
death long after adoption -1.379 -1.065 1.645 3.702 -4.771
(0.696) (0.579) (0.709) (2.334) (4.425)
Effect of laws requiring delegation of treatment decision making in the absence of an advance directive 
death shortly after adoption -0.126 0.313 -1.001 1.123 -1.131
(0.482) (0.502) (0.391) (1.966) (3.226)
death long after adoption 0.292 0.297 -2.026 2.673 -0.859
(0.610) (0.560) (0.608) (2.162) (4.483)
N 536872 536872 536872 324505 53022
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for within state/time cell correlation in parentheses. 26
Table 5: Effect of Laws Governing Advance Directives on 


















Effect of laws enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives
death shortly after adoption -1.141 -0.441 0.823 -0.191 -7.067
(0.490) (0.411) (0.549) (1.983) (3.667)
death long after adoption -1.876 -0.979 0.937 1.436 -7.754
(0.650) (0.581) (0.655) (3.004) (3.765)
Effect of laws requiring delegation of treatment decision making in the absence of an advance directive
death shortly after adoption 0.317 0.816 -0.504 -0.869 -4.257
(0.412) (0.480) (0.369) (1.923) (2.942)
death long after adoption -0.118 0.334 -1.171 2.380 -5.520
(0.466) (0.554) (0.532) (3.005) (4.168)
Differential Effect of Laws For Individuals With High School Education or Greater
Differential effect of laws enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives
death shortly after adoption 1.172 0.503 -0.900 1.324 -1.488
(0.607) (0.492) (0.351) (0.697) (2.233)
death long after adoption 0.932 0.237 -0.477 2.342 1.583
(0.659) (0.564) (0.377) (0.673) (2.386)
Differential effect of laws requiring delegation of treatment decision making in the absence of advance directive
death shortly after adoption 0.096 -0.115 0.201 -0.829 2.591
(0.389) (0.367) (0.317) (0.808) (2.011)
death long after adoption 0.732 0.624 -0.649 1.060 -0.873
(0.404) (0.408) (0.287) (0.766) (2.023)
N 2780195 2780195 2780195 1580579 267474
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for within state/time cell correlation in parentheses. 27
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